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Abstract 
The EU has, belatedly perhaps, engaged with the issue of building an EU identity by setting up various 
initiatives aimed at building a sense of civic society across Europe and hence of greater citizen 
identification with the EU. This article analyses EU policy formulations from the 1970s through to the 
very different conditions of the past decade. It also discusses the process undertaken by the EU 
institutions in order to establish the levels to which and the ways in which its citizens understand and 
‘feel’ themselves to be members of the EU on a personal and individual as well as social and cultural 
level, if at all. The aim of the article is to establish whether this is considered sufficient for the ongoing 
operation of the EU, or, if not, what is lacking.  
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Introduction 
Over the past decade and a half, issues of identity have come to the fore in discussions 
of the state of the European Union, both within the organization and in academic and 
community discourse. Lack of identity here implies a perceived lack or insufficiency of 
self-identification in terms of the EU by the broad constituency of EU citizens, 
regardless of their national identities (Stanley, 2013, p. 5). While problems of 
‘democratic deficit’ have been approached over this period in terms of strengthening 
of the EU Parliament and other relevant institutions, especially since Maastricht, a gap 
has become evident in the civic component of European citizens’ self-identification in 
the wake of events such as the GFC, the refugee crisis, and the COVID crisis. EU citizens 
may identify broadly in cultural and historical terms as ‘European’ but this self-
identification appears to have failed to translate into political terms in the context of 
the second decade of the 21st century (Delanty, 2019, p. 318; Walkenhorst, 2009, p. 1). 
For the EU this has become a major issue. Since the late 1990s commentators have 
increasingly focused on civic rather than political aspects of EU functioning in order to 
explain the weakening in impetus towards an ‘ever closer union’ (Borneman & Fowler, 
1997, p. 487; Castano, 2004, p. 42; Cerutti & Rudolph, 2001, p. 26; Delanty, 2003, p. 
76). In response the EU has developed and implemented policies aimed at 





Commission, 2012, p. 9ff; European Commission, 2014, p. 1ff; European Parliament, 
2020, p. 26ff; Prutsch, 2017, p. 35ff). 
This article will analyse EU policies regarding EU identity development, which aim to 
strengthen a civic sense of commitment to and identification in terms of the European 
Union. This work also intends to contribute to the considerable academic debate that 
has been generated over the past two decades.  
The European Union and Identity 
European citizens, spread across 27 EU member states and various other European 
countries, make up almost half a billion individual identities. In addition to personal, 
family and private individual identities, regional and national identities exist to 
constitute what is referred to as “Europe.” The EU represents a large proportion of 
these groups. Such collective identities have formed over extensive periods of time and 
are complemented partly by additional, co-existing forms of collective identity such as 
supranational, transnational and cosmopolitan identities (Delanty, 2003, pp. 76, 85; 
Eurobarometer, 2018; Habermas, 2009, p. 90). 
Academic debate has shown identity per se to be an evasive, notoriously intangible and 
variable concept, in particular with regard to collective forms such as supranational 
identity (Bruter, 2005, p. 3; Smith, 1992, p. 62). The EU Parliament in 2017 engaged 
with this ambiguous issue of “belonging” to both Europe and to the EU by 
differentiating between a cultural (European) and political (EU) identity, respectively 
(Prutsch, 2017, p. 15). 
Originally primarily conceptualized as an economic space, the EU has developed 
dramatically into a deeper and closer union than merely economic collaboration. Since 
its foundation, the EU institutions have developed along three major lines to 
strengthen an emerging political identity: firstly, by using the economic collaboration 
post WWII between its six founding members to build and ensure peace in historically 
war-torn Europe; secondly, by basing membership on a set of developing criteria in 
terms of civil liberties and human values; and, thirdly, as a political-economic union 
generating high levels of well-being and value of life in the member states, at least 
during the initial years and with the post-1989 enlargement prior to the GFC in 
2007/8. This economic-political union encompassed a dramatically enlarged 
membership of Western, Southern and Eastern European countries (Prutsch, Senior 
Administrator, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, European 
Parliament, 2020, interview).  
A sense of belonging to Europe in this political sense, referred to here as an EU identity, 
has been statistically observed by European institutions and according to 
Eurobarometer has grown over time (Eurobarometer 2006, 2018, 2019). However, 
academic literature (Delanty, 2019, p. xxii; Tekiner, 2020, p. 2) and cetain policy 
documents of the EU itself (European Commission, 2012, p. 28; Prutsch, 2017, p. 5) 
have questioned the correlation between EU institutional development and ‘bottom-
up’ self-identification of citiziens as ‘EUropeans’. In order to understand the amibiton 
of the EU to build a political EU identity, this article will in the following present and 
discuss key EU policy documents.  
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Overview of EU policy documents on EU identity 
The process of European integration started formally with the Treaties of Paris and 
Rome in the early 1950s, leading to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel 
and subsequent European Community (ECSC and EC). Collaboration among EC 
member countries led to a process of increased economic integration. Political leaders 
saw an increasing need to instrumentalise an emerging collective identity, which the 
EC referred to formally as “European identity” as early as 1973 in the Copenhagen 
Declaration. From the perspective of the political leadership of the time, such 
European identity was a result of continuous integration (European Communities, 
1973, p. 119). Hence, cultural similarities of the citizens of then EC members were 
instrumentalised to create a shared belonging, through developed continuous 
integration.  
The world order had also changed over this period: in terms of monetary policies, with 
the end of the Bretton Woods system and in terms of economic policies with an end of 
Keynesian interventionism. As a result, European political elites continued to focus on 
the path of integration and with that European identity as a primary recognition of the 
course forward (Tekiner, 2020, p. 3). The result of the Declaration on European 
Identity (European Communities, 1973, p. 119ff) was a reference to “responsibility 
towards the rest of the world”, which created a hierarchy of identities hence was 
ideologically loaded (Stråth, 2002, p. 387). The intention was to “carry (…) the work 
further in the light of the progress made in the construction of a United Europe” 
(European Communities, 1973, p. 119). European identity was meant to create the 
backbone of identity for an emerging and continuous process of European integration. 
At the same time, the declaration can be understood as an awareness that continuous 
integration does not automatically lead to a sufficiently strong rapprochement of 
citizens of member countries for them to act and think as European citizens. The 
intention was to actively promote European cultural identity, which was also called out 
as a proposal in the so-called Tindemans Report of 1976. The success of this is 
questionable. However, the introduction of European symbols such as the flag, an 
academic exchange program (Erasmus) and eventually the idea of European passports 
are recognized as positive reference points in the academic debate (Karlsson, 1999, p. 
65).  
This cultural Europeanism and national interventionism together with neo-Keynesian 
macroeconomics corresponded to the zeitgeist of the 1970s. The 1980s, however, were 
dominated by a growing neoliberalism in which European integration gained new 
momentum, spurred by its internal setup of a “pan-European tripartite order or 
corporatist bargaining” which positioned European identity regarding its core mission 
and purposes in line with emerging trends such as globalisation and deregulation 
(Stråth, 2002, p. 389). As the EC grew in terms of member countries, its self-
understanding also developed and strengthened in terms of how it presented itself to 
the world.  
In the mid-1980s, the Community founded a ‘Committee for a People’s Europe’ with 
the intention of promoting European identity further and the European Commission 
introduced some first cultural identity politics with a focus on shared cultural heritage 
among Europeans. European institutions have adopted certain shared or core values 





and political pluralism; separation of powers and democratic institutions; protection 
of minorities and respect for civil society” (Tekiner, 2020, p. 3). Some of these had 
already appeared in the Declaration on European Identity in 1973 (European 
Communities, 1973, p. 119). They have been used politically to create a narrative of a 
shared cultural belonging, which can be referred to as EU identity. Symbols introduced 
by the Commission Presidency such as a flag, an anthem and other elements are usually 
part of nation-building processes (Karlsson, 1999, p. 65), which seems to have been the 
intention of the fostering of European identity from a political perspective.  
The establishment of the European Union under the Treaty of Maastricht in the early 
1990s represented a major leap forward in terms of EU identity with the constitution 
of the concept of European citizenship and European institutions acting on behalf of 
the people of Europe. In parallel, however, Euroscepticism increased and neither a 
culturalist strategy of building an EU identity nor additional elements of citizen 
identification through a shared currency, as part of the introduction of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU), seem to have made the citizens of European member states 
into fervent citizens of Europe (understood as the EU) (Tekiner, 2020, p. 4). 
EU identity emerged as an approved research topic for the European Commission in 
the 1990s, in particular in the so-called Framework Programmes for Research and 
Technological Development. The intent has been to understand “how different 
processes of identification with the European Union and its integration project take 
shape and evolve over time, and how to reinforce solidarity among Europeans” 
(European Commission, 2012, p. 4). This indicates a clear awareness by European 
institutions for the need to gain some further understanding in this area with the help 
of EU-funded research, including the so-called “Horizon 2020” programme, the most 
recent Framework Programme for Research (2014-2020) and 20+ research projects 
“which have a bearing on processes of identity formation and identification with(in) 
Europe and the EU”. These programs also serve as policy blueprint for “policy-makers 
in a wider range of domains at EU, national and local levels, from education and culture 
to migration and social policies” (European Commission, 2012, p. 4). 
The review of the Framework Programmes concluded that two models of European 
identity formation can be differentiated: firstly, a ‘culturalist’ perspective, as “an 
orientation to Europe [which] derives fundamentally from core, established European 
values and their expression in public practices, most notably in governance”, hence, 
citizens identify with Europe in a ‘top down’ way or identity stems from being exposed 
to symbols etc.; secondly, a ‘structuralist’ model as “an orientation to Europe [which] 
derives fundamentally from association with other Europeans (…) interacting with 
others” which is a ‘bottom up’ approach. (European Commission, 2012, p. 8).  
With regard to a culturalist perspective, the European Commission sought to finalize 
the drafting of a ‘New Narrative for Europe’ document in 2014 by a group of “artists, 
intellectuals and scientists, and first and foremost citizens” with the intention of 
regaining confidence in Europe (European Commission, 2014, p. 1). This initiative was 
signed off by the European Parliament and the then President of the European 
Commission and was intended as a catalyst to understand Europe’s “state of mind” to 
then be able to develop at some stage “a true and well-functioning political body in 
Europe” (European Commission, 2014, p. 1). Based on the concept of Europe as a 
shared cultural heritage, the narrative document defines Europe as a “moral and 
political responsibility” and as “an identity, an idea, an ideal” (European Commission, 
Grimm, ANZJES 13(1) 
 
38 
2014, p. 1) built around “shared values of peace, freedom, democracy and rule of law” 
and, according to the narrative statement, it has “been deeply embedded in the “raison 
d’être” of Europe” (European Commission, 2014, p. 2). Hence, as a political body, it 
encourages European citizens to “raise their voices to take part in the European public 
space of debate” (European Commission, 2014, p. 3). This same theme of “European 
political elites (…) attempting to add a transnational layer to existing national collective 
identities since the dawn of European integration” is outlined by research for the CULT 
Committee on European identity by the European Parliament. The research report also 
refers to “the assumption [by European institutions] that there is a need to engender a 
feeling of belonging to Europe that goes beyond the economic and institutional 
dimension” (Prutsch, 2017, p. 18).  
This process of achieving “an official and normative declaration of identity” (Prutsch, 
2017, p. 18) started in 1973 with the Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity. 
While no further statements have been published since then in regards to the level of 
prescriptiveness, certain topoi have emerged in the discourse of EU identity among EU 
political elites. These elites use the term Europen identity when they are in fact 
referring to an EU identity consisting of: firstly, a European heritage with “a common 
culture as the crucial element of European identity”; secondly, the two World Wars 
with their horrors and the resulting “momentum to set up ‘Europe’ as a supranational 
peace project”; and thirdly, “European integration itself, the historical achievements 
of which add to the legitimacy of the Union and are embodied in its official symbols” 
(ibid, p. 19). 
The agenda of promoting an EU identity was catapulted to the forefront of EU politics 
at the beginning of the 21st century, in particular as a result of “the failure of the 
ambitious “Constitution for Europe” project, epitomised by the rejection of the draft 
text in France and the Netherlands in the 2005 referendums (…) as an expression of 
growing public disenchantment with European (Union) ‘high politics’”(ibid). This, 
according to the European Parliament, “proved that there was a need for a decisive 
political action going beyond what mainly been symbolic politics” (ibid, p. 19f). 
Concrete outcomes of this newly emerging awareness were a “detailed qualitative study 
by the European Commission on the Europeans, Culture and Cultural Values” in 2005 
and a new programme with the name ‘Europe for Citizens’ by the European Parliament 
and the Council first set up for 2007 to 2013 with a “legal framework to support a wide 
range of activities and organisations”. These were meant to promote “active European 
citizenship”, which the European Parliament defined as “the involvement of citizens 
and civil society organisations in the process of European integration with a view to 
developing a sense of identification” (ibid, p. 20). 
The programme focused on the following objectives: 
• “Giving citizens the opportunity to interact and participate in constructing an 
ever closer Europe, which is democratic and world-oriented, united and 
enrichted throuhg its cultural diversity, thus developing citizenship off the 
European Union; 
• Developing a sense of European identity, based on common values, history and 
culture; 





• Enhancing tolerance and mutual understanding between European citizens 
respecting and promoting cultural and linguistic diversity, while contributing to 
interculturla dialogue” (ibid, p. 20) 
All this was meant to be achieved through exchange, debate, reflection, i.e. “civic 
engagement and active citizenship, which were considered to be key vehicles for 
promoting (European) identity”. It also represented an additional focus to perceive 
Europe and its idea not only as a cultural but, first and foremost, as a political 
community “made up of responsible and active citizens”. While “Citizenship of the 
Union” as a concept was introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the Lisbon 
Treaty underlined this understanding and also introduced “a new form of public 
participation for European citizens through the “citizens’ initiative”, offering EU 
citizens the chance to participate directly in the development of EU policies” (ibid, p. 
21).  
The objectives and initiatives that were introduced “not only marked the 
internalisation of the politico-theoretical concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’ by the 
European Union, but also the gradual shift from a top-down to bottom-up model of 
identiy building” (ibid, p. 21). Instead of political elites defining identity, as was done 
previously, inlcuding with the Cophenhagen Declaration on European Identity, the 
focus has shifted to citizens and their individual action. This was a lenghty learning 
process for European political elites which culminated in the rejection of the EU 
Constitution in 2005 as until then the focus had always been on a top-down agenda 
which resembled nation-building activities. 
The importance of the concept of citizenship continued to be the focus of EU identity 
politics, including in the subsequent Europe for Citizens Programme 2014-2020. 
However, a strong shift has occurred towards the idea of ‘historical remembrance’, 
which has become more important while the term ‘identity’ has almost been removed 
from the programme. According to the report by the European Parliament, this can be 
understood as a “growing disinterest if not discomfort towards ‘(European) identity’ as 
an explicit political objective at EU level and especially among Member States, with the 
Council serving as their mouthpiece” (ibid, p. 22). 
Various crises in Europe and among the member states of the EU itself have occurred, 
i.e., the financial and refugree crises, Brexit, implications of the 2016 US election and 
the political-institutional crisis of the EU. These crises have led to questions regarding 
the ability of the EU to tackle any outstanding issues as it would otherise endanger its 
political legitimacy, which “is intrinsically linked to the question of what holds this 
political construct sui generis together and creates a sense of unity among its citizens” 
(ibid, p. 22). As “the political, economic, and monetary integration of the Union kept 
resting on a cultural sense of belonging to Europe” (Tekiner, 2020, p. 4), in times of 
crises as recently experienced in Europe, the bond between Europeans becomes 
ruptured as the desired EU identity is only based on a fragile feeling of belonging, of 
identifying politically as a European citizen in the making.  
For a long time, it remained questionable how the financial repercussions and other 
consequences of the above mentioned crises would be shared in the European context. 
The repercussions of this have now become a contentious and controversial debate 
among the different camps of collective identity on a European level between a 
supranational approach with sharing risk and costs between all EU members and a 
national approach with individual country approaches. Given the interconnectedness 
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of EU member countries on a mobility level with the Schengen agreement, 
economically with a shared market and monetarily with its currency union, national 
solutions have become inadequate to solve supranational problems.  
European institutions are aware of this problematic situation in which “some deny the 
need for a ‘European identity’ altogether [while] others deem the strengthening of such 
an identity the only way forward”. The future direction of the EU has become an open 
conflict and the question of “how trans-European identity could and should be dealt 
with in the future has become a virtually impossible task”. Hence, the status quo of EU 
identity in the sense of “identification with Europe and the EU continues to be very 
much in the making, and relatively weak in comparison with national identities” 
(Prutsch, 2017, p. 23).  
As a means of overcoming this gridlock, the European Commission is seeking to 
promote the European public and cultural space with its Horizon 2020 strategy and 
aims to “reduce the gap between institutions and citizens – through better 
understanding, analysis and practical solutions – in order to build a more trustful 
European society” (European Commission, 2017a, p. 6). It is assumed that the 
“resilience and cohesion of European societies are strongly conditioned by beliefs and 
identities, as well as by collective representations and constructions of past and present 
realities and expectations about the future”. The European Commission still has not 
given up on its mantra of a narrative for Europe by hypothesizing that research “in the 
humanities and social sciences is well-placed for making important contributions to 
creating a new narrative for Europe by studying the drivers of and obstacles to the 
emergence of a European public sphere and a European cultural space”. Accordingly, 
the European Commission wants to encourage a “better understanding of Europe’s 
cultural, social unity and diversity of its past will inform the reflection about present 
challenges / opportunities and help to find solutions for shaping Europe’s future” 
(European Commission, 2017a, p. 84).  
According to the European Commission, a European cultural, political and economic 
identity has existed for centuries (European Commission, 2017a, p. 100) which as a 
claim rather seems to follow the logic of creating a narrative of shared belonging than 
basing it on actual events (Delanty, 2019, p. 15). Linking European identity to 
integration is considered (or: seen as) challenging due to the culturally diverse 
underlying values and memories which can underline difference and separateness. 
With the self-diagnosis of an incomplete level of European integration but growing 
“xenophobia, extremism, ethnic conflict, Euro-scepticism and the revival of the North-
South and East-West divides, as well as electoral apathy and disenchantment” 
(European Commission, 2017a, p. 100), even a reference to a distinct European space 
as per European Commission does not solve the issues of a lack of further integration. 
Hence, European institutions encourage modelling of ideal types of linking culture and 
integration to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon. 
EU Policies and Operations: Outcomes 
Since the origins of the EU, political elites have called on a narrative of a peace-building 
project in a war-torn continent as a point of reference and identification for European 
citizens, initially as an economic and then also increasingly as a political union. As 
outlined earlier, this sense of belonging was expanded in the 1970s with the 





to as European identity by its authors) was meant to imply. This top-down approach 
was intended to guide citizens of member countries in a prescriptive way as to what 
constituted European identity.  
Despite a long process of integration measures, including the Treaty of Maastricht with 
the formation of the EU and the Schengen Area and later the EMU, European 
institutions cannot be said to have succeeded in inculcating a sense of shared European 
belonging, despite all their efforts. The result of an increasingly negative attitude of EU 
citizens towards the political union could not be ignored or denied any longer by the 
rejection of the EU constitution by referendums in France and the Netherlands, two 
founding members of the earliest collaboration, the European Coal and Steel 
Community.  
The 2014 New Narrative for Europe initiative provides an example of how top-down 
EU policies to create a transnational European memory by tapping into the cultural 
heritage o Europe, framing a narrative of a shared European history, has 
failed.According to Kaiser (2015, p. 364), the final document “illustrates the strict 
limits of such top-down cultural engineering in a transnational polity like the EU.” 
While narratives have been used over centuries, often by cultural elites for the sake of 
political movements or nation-building (cf. Italy, Germany) and also by historians in 
the form of a national identity and nationhood (Berger & Lorenz, 2010, p. 3ff), the 
Narrative for Europe project can be seen “as an express attempt by individual members 
of the EU’s political and bureaucratic elites to motivate members from a partly 
transnationally constituted cultural milieu to frame a new narrative for Europe and the 
EU” (Kaiser, 2015, p. 365). It outlines how ineffective “bureaucratic initiatives [are] in 
influencing collective memory in a polity with partly transnationally constituted elites, 
but without a common public sphere for disseminating narratives consistently across 
space and time” (Kaiser, 2015, p. 366).  
Major efforts to boost EU identity have ceased in the wake of the GFC and the monetary 
crisis. Then, eventually, European leaders met in 2017, still committed to the EU’s 
motto of ‘unity in diversity’ but clearly with less enthusiasm, “to discuss the future role 
of education and culture in strengthening the sense of belonging together and being 
part of a cultural community” (European Commission, 2017b, p. 2). In contrast to 
framing a top-down transnational memory, an EU identity can indeed also be 
strengthened over time through education and culture, which then occurs in a more 
organic, bottom-up way. In addition to existing programmes, European leaders also 
outlined their “vision of a European Education Area, building on the New Skills Agenda 
for Europe and the investing in Europe’s youth initiatives”. The intention here is to 
make Europe’s labour market more resilient and prepare the European workforce for 
“rapid and profound changes induced by the technological revolution and 
globalisation” (ibid, p. 2). It can also be seen as a way to encourage citizens to recognize 
that European political involvement has tangible benefits which would potentially 
make them view the EU, European institutions and hence European integration in a 
more positive light. 
European institutions have been aware of their limited competencies in the area of 
education and culture as these “in line with the principle of subsidiarity” lie primarily 
“with Member States at national, regional and local level”. Hence, “[t]he Union’s 
competences are limited to encouraging cooperation, supporting and complementing 
national action” and the Union can continue to “finance programmes” such as the 
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popular Erasmus programme in the space of education and media for cultural 
engagement (ibid, p. 2).  
The raison d’être for education to be considered as a means of identity building stems 
from the fact that it “forms the basis for active citizenship and helps prevent populism, 
xenophobia and violent radicalisation”. Culture is regarded as quintessential, as the 
continent’s “cultural diversity is a strength that fuels creativity and innovation,” 
together constituting “the European way of life”. Both encourage people to engage in 
cross-border human connections and exchange which can lead to an awareness “of 
what it means to be ‘European’”. Hence, “cultural heritage and diversity are 
prerequisites to maintain [Europe’s] cultural community, [its] common values and 
identity” (ibid, p. 3).  
In addition to actively promoting European citizenship, the European Parliament has 
analysed pathways for future political integration in Europe and raised the idea of a 
political compact as a means to create a more democratic and effective union. This idea 
took the form of “a Conference on the Future of Europe as a new model to reform the 
EU” which ideally “has the potential to be a transformative moment for the EU”. 
Despite the delay caused by COVID-19, the current economic and health situation 
“revealed in an unequivocal way the need to overhaul the EU and to make it more 
effective and legitimate” (European Parliament, 2020, p. 10f). The Conference on the 
Future of Europe is now scheduled to run over the course of the next two years until 
2022.  
The conference faces one major roadblock on the path to further integration, namely 
EU treaty change. Reforms, as outlined in “the EU treaty amendment rule”, require 
“the approval by all Member States meeting in an intergovernmental conference (IGC) 
and unanimous ratification at the national level”. The rejection of the EU constitution 
exemplified the challenging nature of this clause. One pathway to circumvent obstacles 
associated with treaty change is to introduce international agreements that can be 
“concluded outside the EU legal order”. Such agreements, with the potential to speed 
up the process, have been used in the past (European Parliament, 2020, p. 11). While 
any discussion on potential EU reforms would go beyond the scope of this article, the 
European Parliament is vocal about the necessity for a Conference on the Future of 
Europe as a much “needed initiative to reform the EU institutions and powers, to 
address important shortcomings in the EU governance system, and to chart a path 
towards further European integration after Brexit, and COVID” (European Parliament, 
2020, p. 11).  
All changes to the EU governance system have an impact on the EU’s ability to 
introduce policies to strengthen an EU identity by supporting initiatives which 
enhance feelings of belonging and European citizenship in general. As outlined above, 
such initiatives can be of educational or cultural nature. Over the past decades, 
initiatives focused on a bottom-up approach to engaging citizens have led to better 
outcomes than those introducing a top-down European narrative on what EU identity 
is meant to be.  
Conclusion 
The EU has engaged with the issue of building an EU identity. This has met with only 





has become visible when defining what EU (then referred to as European) identity was 
meant to imply with a shared narrative and in terms of civic engagement and a 
European sense of belonging. While a political union was created, it lacks the political 
identification of its EU citizens. Such political citizens rather grow as an emerging 
process due to education and culture from a bottom-up perspective over time and 
without the prescriptiveness of an institutionalised formation of what an EU identity 
is meant to be. Recent engagement of European institutions has focused on such an 
approach and included giving European citizens a voice in any EU reform in the form 
of civic engagement on the path of defining what the future of Europe can look like.  
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